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5.1    Introduction
Early retirement in Germany is very costly and ampliﬁ  es the burden that 
the German public pension system has to carry due to population aging. 
Beneﬁ  ts paid to individuals aged sixty-  four years or younger are about one-
 quarter of total beneﬁ  ts paid. This corresponds to about 5 percentage points 
of the current contribution rate.
Our earlier analyses (Börsch- Supan and Schnabel 1998, 1999; Berkel and 
Börsch- Supan 2004; Börsch- Supan et al. 2004; Börsch- Supan, Schnabel, and 
Kohnz 2007) have shown that an important reason for the large and costly 
extent of early retirement in Germany is the force of early retirement incen-
tives built into the German public pension system. The provisions driving 
workers into early retirement are not accidental side eﬀects of the pension 
system design. They are still in place, with the explicit motivation to “make 
room for the young.” Underlying this is the popular belief that employment 
of older individuals crowds out employment of younger individuals. Turned 
positively, many believe that for each individual sent into early retirement, a 
younger individual can take up a new job.
The belief is deeply rooted in the analogy of a small enterprise with a ﬁ  xed 
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and small number of clients who have a ﬁ  xed demand for the product of the 
enterprise. Such an enterprise is boxed into a ﬁ  xed amount of output and 
therefore can only employ a ﬁ  xed lump of labor.
This chapter shows that this boxed-  in enterprise is not at all a good anal-
ogy to an entire economy. In fact, our evidence shows that higher employ-
ment of older individuals is positively correlated with higher employment of 
the young. In contrast to the small enterprise just described, entire econo-
mies can grow, increasing the demand for all goods and services and there-
fore also the demand for labor. It is a fallacy to believe that there is a ﬁ  xed 
lump of labor to be distributed among the young and the old: jobs for the 
old do not have to be taken away from the young. Moreover, costs for early 
retirement cannot be put on someone else’s shoulders, as enterprises often 
can do it. In an entire economy, all social transfer expenses have to be borne 
by tax and contribution payers.
This insight might be unpopular. However, it is anything but new. Figure 
5.1 shows data from a set of Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries clearly indicating that countries with a high 
prevalence of early retirement generally have higher unemployment rates 
and lower employment of the young.
In spite of such suggestive evidence, the misconception of a ﬁ  xed lump 
of labor that has to be shared between the old and the young (the “lump of 
labor fallacy” or the “boxed economy view”) keeps dominating much of the 
policy debate on pension reform in Germany and elsewhere. The suggestive 
power of a small enterprise with a ﬁ  xed and small number of clients as a 
model for the entire economy appears to be stronger than the suggestive 
power of ﬁ  gure 5.1.1
The topic is timely and relevant in Germany. A controversial 2007 reform 
(“Rente mit 67”) will raise the statutory retirement age from sixty-  ﬁ  ve to 
sixty- seven in annual steps between 2012 and 2028. According to the original 
reform design, at the end of the transition phase in 2028, full beneﬁ  ts will 
be paid at age sixty-  seven, and retirement at age sixty-  ﬁ  ve will lead to a 7.2 
percent reduction (two years times 3.6 percent) of beneﬁ  ts.
This fundamental decision to adjust the length of working life to the 
increased total life span has been confronted with the argument that raising 
the retirement age would lead to higher unemployment among the young, 
and it continues to be watered down. First, already during the legislative 
process, the actuarial adjustments were limited to persons with an employ-
ment career of less than forty-  ﬁ  ve years—that is, there will be no actuarial 
adjustment for those with a “full” working life of forty-  ﬁ  ve years or more. 
Moreover, the duration of unemployment beneﬁ  ts has been extended for 
older workers, thereby reversing important decisions of the so-  called Hartz 
1. Figure 5.1 is only suggestive, as it depicts a positive correlation between two macrolevel 
variables but not a causal relationship; see the following discussion.Early Retirement and Employment of the Young in Germany    1 4 9
reforms of the German labor market. Finally, there is increasing pressure by 
the unions to extend subsidizing part-  time retirement. Such subsidies were 
originally introduced to permit a ﬂ  exible transition from full-  time work via 
part-  time work/part-  time retirement to full retirement. However, almost all 
workers choose to divide the ﬁ  ve-  year transition period into one block of 
full- time work and another block of full retirement, eﬀectively reducing the 
early retirement age by 2.5 years (“Blockaltersteilzeit”).
Given the actual policy debate, it would be extremely helpful to know 
more about the relationship between retirement policy and employment of 
the young, speciﬁ  cally in Germany, and to provide a causal interpretation 
of ﬁ  gure 5.1. This is the aim of this chapter. It shows that the German data 
provide no evidence for the belief that older workers take jobs away from the 
young. In fact, if there is a link at all, higher employment of older individuals 
in Germany is positively correlated with higher employment of the young.
The chapter uses various pension design changes in Germany as instru-
ments to identify how higher or lower employment of older individuals has 
aﬀected the employment of the young. The central question of this chapter, 
therefore, is: how did pension reforms aﬀect the labor market—in particular, 
employment and unemployment of the old versus the young?
Section 5.2 of the chapter summarizes important pension reform steps in 
Germany. Section 5.3 describes employment and unemployment over time 
by age group and attempts to draw ﬁ  rst links between changes in employ-
ment patterns and pension reforms. Section 5.4 provides the analytical part 
of the chapter. We quantify the changes of early retirement incentives over 
time and measure their eﬀect on older workers’ employment. This follows 
our earlier work. We then answer the central and more diﬃcult question: 
Fig. 5.1    Early retirement and unemployment in the OECD
Source: Own calculations based on OECD Employment Outlook 2007.150        Axel Börsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel
how did this aﬀect the labor market, in general, and employment of the 
young, in particular? Section 5.5 concludes.
Our methodology can be interpreted as a reduced-  form analysis. We 
regress labor market outcomes for the young on employment of the old, 
using pension policy changes for a regression discontinuity design. We also 
regress labor market outcomes directly on changes in the policy instruments. 
The theoretical framework behind this reduced-  form analysis is a macro-
economic model of a pension system, labor markets for young and old, and 
product demand. Such a model is provided, for example, by Börsch-  Supan 
and Ludwig (2008). It is noteworthy that such a model produces a positive 
correlation between retirement age and employment.
Quite clearly, we need “strong” reforms in order to empirically identify 
the eﬀects of pension policies on labor market outcomes for the young, 
since there are many confounding factors operating at the same time. In 
Germany, we can identify several such important reforms that dramatically 
changed retirement incentives. In response, retirement behavior changed 
equally dramatically.
Moreover, we have to care about the potential endogeneity of pension 
policy changes. An endogeneity problem arises if the pension reform was 
triggered by higher youth unemployment. In this case, the reform cannot 
be used as an instrument in econometric analysis, and causal analysis will 
fail.2
Finally, pension reform may be just one element in a reform package, 
which also includes labor market reforms. In this case, it may be impossible 
to identify which reform element actually caused the results.
In order to take care of these concerns, we exploit what we know from the 
historical policy debate (section 5.2) and what we can learn from the labor 
market outcomes at that time (section 5.3). With respect to endogeneity, 
we will argue that at least two reforms were not motivated by employment 
concerns. The ﬁ  rst reform came into eﬀect in 1972 in a period of labor 
shortage, not youth unemployment. The second reform was drafted before 
reuniﬁ  cation in 1989 in a situation of decreasing unemployment and was 
phased in between 1998 and 2004. This reform was motivated by concerns 
about the long-  term solvency of the public pay-  as-  you-  go (PAYG) pension 
system (Prognos 1995, 1998) in the face of population aging.
Potentially confounding factors were other reforms in Germany, among 
them being the extension of worker protection rules (layoﬀ protection), the 
reductions in standard working hours through collective contracts, various 
changes in education policy (increasing educational attainment, prolonged 
education), and changes in immigration policy. Most of these other policy 
changes can be dated precisely. Hence, we focus on those pension reforms 
that did not concur with general labor market reforms. In addition, we will 
2. A causal interpretation of ﬁ  gure 5.1 suﬀers from this critique.Early Retirement and Employment of the Young in Germany    1 5 1
investigate the time and lag patterns in order to minimize the contamination 
of the relation between retirement and employment of the young.
5.2      Regimes of Retirement Policies in Germany
The German pension system, designed by Bismarck almost 120 years ago, 
began as a funded system but was transformed into a pay-  as-  you-  go sys-
tem in 1957 after about half of the capital stock was lost in two world wars 
and a hyperinﬂ  ation.
As opposed to other countries such as the United Kingdom and the Neth-
erlands, which originally adopted a Beveridgian social security system that 
provided only a base pension, public pensions in Germany are designed to 
extend the standard of living that was achieved during working life also to 
the time after retirement: individual pension beneﬁ  ts are essentially propor-
tional to individual labor income averaged over the entire life course and 
feature only few redistributive properties.
The following brief history of the German pension system distinguishes 
four phases:3 (a) a relatively stable phase after the introduction of the pay- 
as-  you-  go system until 1972; (b) a phase of increasing generosity precipi-
tated by the 1972 pension reform; (c) a phase of cost-  cutting reforms after 
1992, leading to a sustainable pension system by 2007; and (d) ﬁ  rst signs that 
we may actually experience a phase of reform backlash. While this section 
focuses on pension reforms, we will at several instances refer to the following 
section 5.3 for concurring labor market outcomes.
5.2.1      Phase 1 (1957 to 1972): Stability
Initially, the pay- as- you- go system introduced in 1957 had a single eligibil-
ity age for old-  age pension: age sixty-  ﬁ  ve for men and age sixty for women 
(conditioned on a minimum number of years of service). Earlier retirement 
was impossible unless one could prove a disability. Disability rates were very 
high after World War II and then declined; employment of elderly males 
was increasing until about 1967 and declined slightly after the recession of 
1967 (see the employment history provided in section 5.3—in particular, 
ﬁ  gure 5.6).
5.2.2      Phase 2 (1972 to 1992): Increasing Generosity
The 1972 reform was a major change in policy. It introduced “ﬂ  exible 
retirement” by providing old-  age pension beneﬁ  ts at age sixty-  three, given 
that workers had a minimum of thirty-  ﬁ  ve years of which they contributed 
to the system. These beneﬁ  ts were not actuarially adjusted. It is impor-
tant to note that the 1972 reform was not motivated by labor market con-
3. For a detailed description of the evolution of the German pension system, see Börsch-
  Supan and Wilke (2006).152        Axel Börsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel
cerns. Rather, this very popular bipartisan reform decision was celebrated 
as a major achievement to provide more leisure to the workers. Indeed, the 
average retirement age dropped by more than two years, and employment 
rates of older individuals plummeted (see ﬁ  gure 5.6).
Between 1984 and 1987, early retirement was further extended by cre-
ating a “bridge to retirement.” The government introduced more generous 
unemployment insurance beneﬁ  ts for older workers, which were especially 
attractive in the age range from ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  nine years: up to thirty-
  two months of unemployment insurance beneﬁ  ts at 63 or 68 percent of 
former net wages. These beneﬁ  ts were not means tested, and job-  search 
activities were not required for those unemployed who were aged ﬁ  fty-
 ﬁ  v e   a n d   o l d e r.   I n   a d d i t i o n ,   s e v e r a n c e   p a y   b e c a m e   t a x   a d v a n t a g e d   f o r   t h e  
employees.
As opposed to the 1972 reform, these changes in the eligibility and dura-
tion of unemployment beneﬁ  ts were explicitly motivated by the increasing 
unemployment (see ﬁ  gure 5.2) and the desire to “make room for young work-
ers.” As a result of the “bridge to retirement,” registered unemployment of 
the elderly (age ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  nine) rose immediately, and the pathways 
to retirement changed dramatically. Disability beneﬁ  ts declined, while the 
uptake of unemployment insurance became the most important pathway to 
retirement by 1990 (see ﬁ  gure 5.5).
5.2.3      Phase 3 (1992 to 2007): Sustainability Reforms
Threatened by demographic change, Germany began in the early 1990s 
a ﬁ  fteen-  year-  long process of reform steps. These reform steps were not 
masterminded; some “happened” due to budget crises and new political 
constellations. Seen from hindsight, however, the reform steps follow an 
astoundingly consistent red threat.
Step 1: Toward Actuarial Adjustments (1992)
The ﬁ  rst step in the long German reform process was the 1992 reform. It 
anchored beneﬁ  ts to net rather than to gross wages. This removed an odd 
mechanism that would have created a vicious cycle of increasing pension 
beneﬁ  ts in response to increasing contribution rates. At the same time, cred-
its for higher education were abolished and survivor beneﬁ  ts reduced.
The second important element in the 1992 reform was the introduction 
of “actuarial” adjustments to beneﬁ  ts to retirement age. “Actuarial” is set 
in quotation marks because the adjustment factors have been set discretion-
arily at 3.6 percent for each year of earlier retirement and are not directly 
linked to changes in life expectancy. They are about 1.5 percentage points 
lower than current life tables, and a 3 percent discount rate would imply.4 
4. Actuarial computations depend on a discount or interest rate, which makes payments 
made or received at diﬀerent points in time commensurable. Usually, a rate of 3 percent is 
assumed—sometimes 4 or 5 percent. The German computations rest on a discount rate of 
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Nevertheless, their gradual introduction between 1998 and 2006 reduced 
incentives to retire early, and retirement age and labor force participation 
of older individuals has indeed increased since then, almost symmetrically 
to the decline after the 1972 reform (see ﬁ  gure 5.3 and Börsch- Supan (1992) 
for an early prediction of this eﬀect).
Step 2: Toward a Genuine Multipillar System (2001)
The ﬁ  nancial situation of the pension system worsened rather quickly 
after the 1998 elections that brought the Social Democrats to power in Ger-
many. As a remarkable irony in politics, the former union leader, then secre-
tary of labor Walter Riester, successfully passed a major reform bill through 
parliament in 2001.5
The Riester reform is a major change of the German public pension sys-
tem. It changed the monolithic pay-  as-  you-  go retirement insurance to a 
genuine multipillar system by partially substituting pay- as- you- go ﬁ  nanced 
pensions with funded pensions. The reform aimed to achieve three main 
objectives. First, the reform was to stabilize contribution rates. The Riester 
reform law actually states that contribution rates to the public retirement 
insurance scheme must stay below 20 percent until 2020 and below 22 per-
cent until 2030, while the net replacement rate must stay above 67 percent. 
Failure must precipitate further government action. Second, a new pillar of 
supplementary- funded pensions was introduced. Contributions to this pillar 
are subsidized, either by tax deferral and tax deduction or by direct subsidies. 
These supplementary pensions, however, are not mandatory. Third, bene-
ﬁ  ts of the pay-  as-  you-  go system were scheduled to be gradually reduced in 
proportion to the maximum subsidized contribution to the new supplemen-
tary pensions.
Step 3: Toward Sustainability (2004)
Although praised as a “century reform,” it quickly became obvious that 
the cost-  cutting measures of the Riester reform would not suﬃce to meet 
the contribution rate targets. A new reform commission, the Commission 
for Sustainability in Financing the German Social Insurance Systems, was 
established in November 2002.6 Its twin objectives were those of the Riester 
reform: to stabilize contribution rates, while at the same time ensuring ap-
propriate future beneﬁ  t levels.
The commission met in 2003 under very diﬀerent circumstances than 
Riester faced just a few years earlier. Unexpectedly high unemployment 
rates and the poor performance of the German economy with extremely low 
growth rates precipitated a short-  run ﬁ  nancial crisis of the pension system 
5. The 2001 reform, therefore, is popularly referred to as the Riester reform.
6. This was popularly referred to as the Rürup commission after its chairman, Bert Rürup. 
The commission was in charge of making reform proposals for the pension system, health care, 
and long-  term care insurance. We only refer to the proposals of the pension group, which was 
cochaired by one of the authors of this chapter.154        Axel Börsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel
and created a sense of urgency for reform. Moreover, the electorate became 
increasingly aware that stabilizing social security contributions and thus 
limiting the increase of total labor compensation would be essential for 
enhancing future growth. This paradigm shift away from thinking in pension 
claims toward thinking in ﬁ  nancing possibilities had a noticeable impact on 
the commission’s reform proposals.
The commission proposed an entire reform package (Kommission 2003). 
In addition to a gradual shift of the retirement age in proportion to the 
expected change of life length after retirement, the key element of the com-
mission’s reform proposal was a new pension beneﬁ  t indexation formula, 
linking beneﬁ  ts to the system dependency ratio, called the “sustainability 
formula.”7 It would lead to further decreases in pension beneﬁ  ts vis-  à-  vis 
the path planned by the Riester reform. Most of the commission proposals, 
and most signiﬁ  cantly the introduction of the sustainability formula, were 
quickly passed by the German Parliament in May 2004.
In parallel, the government also passed major changes to the unemploy-
ment insurance system, called the “Hartz reforms.”8 They dramatically 
shortened the duration of unemployment beneﬁ  ts, especially for older 
individuals, to eighteen months (rather than thirty-  two months) and made 
unemployment insurance much less attractive as a substitute for early retire-
ment beneﬁ  ts.
Step 4: Toward Later Retirement Ages (2007)
The commission also proposed an increase of the normal retirement age 
from sixty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  seven years, according to a schedule from 2011 to 
2035 reﬂ  ecting expected future changes in life expectancy. The underlying 
rationale was to divide the life time gained in proportion to the current divi-
sion between life time in work and in retirement—namely, two to one. In 
order to prevent substitution into early retirement and disability pensions as 
a result of the increase of the retirement age, the commission also proposed 
to increase the early retirement ages (to the same extent and on the same 
schedule as the normal retirement age) and to increase the actuarial adjust-
ments for disabled and long-  term insured workers.
The shift in the retirement age was deemed too politically dangerous and 
was excluded from the legislation package in March 2004. The unions heav-
ily opposed this adaptation of retirement age to life expectancy, arguing that 
it would lead to higher unemployment and take jobs away from the young.
Nevertheless, in yet another ironic move, just two years later, with popula-
tion aging high on the political agenda, the then labor secretary Müntefering 
unilaterally announced an accelerated increase of the retirement age, to be 
fully eﬀective in 2028. It was legislated in March 2007.
7. Technical details are described in Börsch-  Supan and Wilke (2006).
8. Peter Hartz, former chief personnel oﬃcer at Volkswagen, headed the commission.Early Retirement and Employment of the Young in Germany    1 5 5
5.2.4      Phase 4: Reform Backlash?
The increase of the retirement age angered the left wing and was watered 
down by exemptions for those workers who had forty-  ﬁ  ve years of service. 
This may have been the beginning of a period of reform backlash. Under 
increasing pressure from the newly founded “Left Party,” the grand coalition 
government reverted the decision to shorten the duration of unemployment 
insurance beneﬁ  ts for older workers, which was part of the “Hartz- IV” labor 
market reform. Moreover, the government decided in the spring of 2008 
to make a two-  year exemption from the sustainability formula in order to 
increase pension beneﬁ  ts in 2008 and 2009 when federal elections would 
be held. Finally, the issue of “blockwise partial retirement”—essentially, 
an early retirement device—is back on the agenda. It is too early to judge 
whether these changes will end the phase of sustainability reform and begin 
a phase of reform rollbacks. It is important to note that the “make place 
for younger workers” argument is quoted almost always as a motivation to 
revert earlier reform steps.
5.3      Descriptive Analysis: Employment and Retirement Over Time
As noted, most pension reforms—those that increased generosity as 
well as those that cut costs to improve sustainability—had immediate con-
sequences for employment and retirement. This section provides a more 
detailed depiction of employment and retirement patterns between 1960 
and 2006. It is based on employment and labor force participation data 
taken from the German Bureau of the Census (“Mikrozensus”), unemploy-
ment ﬁ  gures from the Federal Labor Agency (“Bundesagentur für Arbeit”), 
and retirement patterns from the German Public Pension Administration 
(“Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund”).
We ﬁ rst give an extensive description of the employment, unemployment, 
and retirement patterns before and immediately after the 1972 reform. Sub-
section 5.3.2 then summarizes the main labor force trends between 1972 
and 2006, with particular attention to two further reform steps—namely, 
the “bridge to retirement” in 1984 and the gradual phase in of actuarial 
adjustments after 1998. The third subsection is devoted to a detailed anal-
ysis of youth (un)employment. Subsection 5.3.4 draws ﬁ  rst conclusions from 
our descriptive analyses.
5.3.1      Employment, Unemployment, and Retirement 
Patterns before and after the 1972 Reform
The 1972 reform was introduced during a time of full employment—or 
better, even labor shortage. Unemployment rates, quickly declining during 
the German “economic miracle” in the 1950s, were very low in the 1960s 
and early 1970s before the ﬁ  rst oil shock; see ﬁ  gure 5.2.156        Axel Börsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel
Even in the recession year 1967, the aggregate unemployment rate barely 
exceeded 1 percent. As a matter of fact, companies were forced to hire mil-
lions of foreign workers from southern Europe and Turkey to overcome 
serious problems of labor shortage. Therefore, the pension reform of 1972 
(indicated by the dotted line in ﬁ  gure 5.2 and drafted well before that year) 
was certainly not motivated by labor market problems of the young. The 
unemployment rate of young workers below age twenty-  ﬁ  ve was about the 
same as the average rate of 0.7 percent in the prereform year 1971; see table 
5.1. During the sixties and early seventies, youth unemployment was consis-
tently low and about the same level as unemployment of prime age workers 
(age twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four).
The unemployment rate of elderly workers was only slightly higher at 
1.06 percent in the prereform year 1971. During the recession of 1967, the 
unemployment rate of the elderly jumped to 3.6 percent, which was twice 
the average rate. However, it is also unlikely that labor market problems of 
the elderly motivated the pension reform of 1972, given that unemployment 
of the elderly normalized to levels around 1 percent immediately after the 
recession of 1967 (ﬁ  gure 5.2).
The 1972 reform had an immediate eﬀect on the labor force participation 
of older men.9 Figure 5.3 shows the dramatic decline of the mean retire-
ment age from about age sixty-  ﬁ  ve years in the years preceding the reform 
to about age 62.5 after the reform. The subsequent stability of the retire-
ment age during the eighties and nineties is remarkable; a signiﬁ  cant change 
occurred only after the year 2000.
The eﬀect of the 1972 reform is particularly pronounced as a change in 
Fig. 5.2    Unemployment rate in West Germany, 1950 to 1979
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
9. The law did not change the much earlier retirement age for women.Early Retirement and Employment of the Young in Germany    1 5 7
the most frequently chosen retirement age; see ﬁ  gure 5.4. Before the 1972 
reform, the most frequent retirement age was sixty-  ﬁ  ve—the statutory 
retirement age—with retirement before that date only due to disability. In 
1975, two peaks emerged: age sixty-  ﬁ  ve—the statutory retirement age—
and age sixty- three—the new early eligibility age. In 1980, age sixty became 
Table 5.1  Unemployment rates by demographic groups in year 1971 (%)
All   Males   Females   Age  25   Age 25 to 54   Age 55
0.70  0.6   0.9   0.76   0.59   1.06
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
Fig. 5.3    Mean retirement age, old-  age pensions, males
Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, Rentenzugangsstatistik.
Fig. 5.4    Distribution of retirement ages: Males
Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, Rentenzugangsstatistik.158        Axel Börsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel
the most frequent actual retirement age, reﬂ  ecting the various exemptions 
from the early eligibility age of sixty-  three that were due to unemployment, 
among other things.
The 1972 reform law also dramatically changed the pathways to retire-
ment for men; see ﬁ  gure 5.5. The new “ﬂ  exible retirement” at age sixty- three 
became very popular and replaced a substantial portion of disability pen-
sions. After a short while, however, people discovered that the newly intro-
duced old- age pensions for the disabled and/or unemployed were even more 
attractive, creating the spike at age sixty that is visible in ﬁ  gure 5.4. Note that 
there was no corresponding change in retirement pathways of women, who 
were not aﬀected by the 1972 reform.
5.3.2      Employment and Unemployment after the 1972 Reform
Labor force participation of the elderly dropped immediately after 1972—
see ﬁ  gure 5.6—reﬂ  ecting the earlier exit from the labor force (the ﬁ  rst vertical 
bar indicates the 1972 reform). By the end of the eighties, only 30 percent 
of the age group sixty to sixty-  four were employed.
However, this did not seem to help the young, whose labor force participa-
tion actually fell in parallel to labor force participation of the old. The youth 
unemployment rate actually jumped to 5.6 percent in 1975 and remained at 
that level until 1978; see ﬁ  gure 5.7.
The cause for the dramatic change in labor market conditions after 1973 
was the ﬁ  rst oil shock. Unemployment rose to new levels in Germany, reach-
ing 4 percent in 1975. The youth workforce was hit most by that recession. 
Youth unemployment became a major political concern at the end of the 
seventies. This was also connected to the concern that the large size of the 
baby boom generations might cause additional problems.
Fig. 5.5    Pathways to retirement
Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, Rentenzugangsstatistik.Fig. 5.6    Labor force participation of youth, young and elderly males
Source: German Mikrozensus.
Fig. 5.7    Unemployment rates, 1966 to 2006, by age groups (West Germany)
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit.160        Axel Börsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel
A new problem evolved in the 1980s: unemployment did not return to 
prerecession levels after the ﬁ  rst oil shock. Instead, it remained high and 
exhibited the pattern of a hysteresis problem. This pattern was repeated in 
each of the following business cycles. Unemployment rates hit a high in the 
winter of 2004/2005.
In 1984, the “bridge to retirement” (see section 5.2) was introduced (indi-
cated by the second vertical bar in ﬁ  gures 5.6 and 5.7). It decreased employ-
ment of individuals aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  nine (see ﬁ  gure 5.6). At the same 
time, their unemployment rate went up dramatically, indicating the popu-
larity of using unemployment insurance as an early retirement pathway 
(ﬁ  gure 5.7). The employment eﬀects on the young, however, did not go up 
in response (ﬁ  gure 5.6), as those who believe in the “boxed economy view” 
would have predicted.
Another reform step is indicated by the third vertical bar in ﬁ  gures 5.6 
and 5.7. It represents the phasing in of “actuarial” adjustments after 1998. 
Figures 5.3 and 5.6 show the trend reversal of employment of the elderly: 
labor force participation increases from 30 percent to 40 percent in the age 
group from sixty to sixty-  four years.
5.3.3      Employment and Unemployment of the Young
Labor force participation of the young (ages ﬁ  fteen to nineteen) was as 
high as 80 percent in 1960. It dropped below 50 percent due to extended 
schooling (introduction of tenth grade in middle school) and rising par-
ticipation in higher education (gymnasium, college) well before the 1973 
recession; see ﬁ  gure 5.8.
The main expansion of education took place in the years from 1960 to 
1974—that is, during times of full employment: the number of the young in 
education doubled from 20 percent to 40 percent in the years between 1960 
and 1974. Extended general schooling was not a device to take youth from 
the unemployment rolls; if anything, it aggravated labor shortages.
Unemployment rose quickly after 1974. If extended education had been 
a substitute for unemployment in those years, we would expect increasing 
education during times of rising unemployment (i.e., 1974 to 1977, 1980 to 
1983). Education rates, however, stayed fairly constant around 40 percent 
from 1974 to 1990.
College enrollment increased linearly from 1960 to 2003, very indepen-
dently from economic booms and busts. Enrollment as a fraction of the 
population at ages nineteen to twenty- nine was 3 percent in 1960, 8.5 percent 
in 1974, 12.8 percent in 1988, and 18.5 percent in 2002.
5.3.4      Conclusions from the Descriptive Analysis
Combining the insights from sections 5.2 and 5.3, the following four con-
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•   The 1972 reform was not driven by labor market considerations. It dra-
matically reduced retirement age, labor force participation, and employ-
ment of older individuals. In spite of the dramatic reduction of old- age 
employment in the aftermath of the 1972 reform, youth employment 
did not increase.
•    The “bridge to retirement” introduced in 1984 further decreased em-
ployment of individuals aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  nine. Their unemploy-
ment rate went up dramatically, indicating the popularity of using un-
employment insurance as an early retirement pathway. Employment of 
the young, however, did not go up in response.
•   The phasing in of “actuarial” adjustments after 1998 reversed the trend 
of early retirement. Employment increased from 30 percent to 40 per-
cent in the age group from sixty to sixty- four years. There is a very slight 
concurrent decrease in employment of the young.
•   Increasing education from 1960 to 1974 was not driven by labor market 
problems of the young. Over the entire period (1960 to 2006), there is 
no correlation between the uptake of education and youth unemploy-
ment.
Hence, the “boxed economy view” is not supported by the employment 
trends from 1960 to 2006. In almost all cases, employment of the young 
Fig. 5.8    Youth employment, unemployment, education, and college
Source: Own calculations based on the German Mikrozensus (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007) 
and unemployment statistics (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2008).162        Axel Börsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel
and the old moved in tandem up or down. The only exception is the time 
after 1998. We claim, however, that the slight decrease in employment of the 
young is a reﬂ  ection of the business cycle and not a response to the introduc-
tion of actuarial adjustments. In order to show this claim, we proceed to a 
more analytical approach in the following section.
5.4    Regression  Analysis:  Eﬀects on the Young
Our regression analysis is based on the assumption that an exogenous 
policy Z(t) changes the labor supply of the elderly—for example, by raising 
the implicit tax on labor for the elderly. In our earlier work, we have shown 
that such a change in the incentives to retire signiﬁ  cantly aﬀects the employ-
ment of the elderly. In this section, we focus on the empirical eﬀects of early 
retirement policies on the employment of the young, focusing on three labor 
market outcomes:
•   EMP(a, y)  employment rate (employment in age group a in year 
y/population in age group a in year y)
•   UE(a, y)  unemployment rate (unemployed persons in age group a in 
year y/labor force participation in age group a in year y)
•   SCH(y)  educational participation of the young (persons in education 
in age group ﬁ  fteen to twenty-  four in year y/population aged ﬁ  fteen to 
twenty-  four in year y)
We use age group ﬁ  fteen to twenty-  four to indicate young individuals 
because of the speciﬁ  c German system of schooling and training. The 
regular school leaving age used to be ﬁ  fteen (after ninth grade). This was 
followed by an apprenticeship, which counts as employment, and combined 
on- the- job training and work on four days with formal schooling on one day 
per week. Prime aged individuals are deﬁ  ned as aged between twenty-  ﬁ  ve 
and ﬁ  fty-  four.
5.4.1      Labor Outcome for the Young as Function of Elderly Employment
We ﬁ rst regress the labor outcome variables of young and prime aged 
individuals on the elderly employment variable. Results are shown in table 
5.2. The ﬁ  rst panel shows the coeﬃcients of elderly employment without 
controls, the second panel with controls. These controls should account for 
general macroeconomic eﬀects and include gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita and the growth rate of GDP per capita, plus the average wage 
and the eﬀective minimum wage (social assistance beneﬁ  ts on an hourly 
basis).
Each panel of table 5.2 includes four diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations: a regression 
in levels, a regression in levels with a three- year lagged dependent variable, a 
regression in diﬀerences (ﬁ  ve years), and a regression in log diﬀerences.Early Retirement and Employment of the Young in Germany    1 6 3
Results are very sensitive to the speciﬁ  cation chosen. However, there are 
very few speciﬁ  cations that support the “lump of labor” view (marked in 
bold italics). In many more speciﬁ  cations, higher employment of the elderly 
goes hand in hand with higher employment and lower unemployment of the 
young (marked in bold). The “eﬀect” of elderly employment on unemploy-
ment of the young is either signiﬁ  cantly negative, or it is insigniﬁ  cant. The 
same holds for the relation between elderly employment and unemployment 
of prime age persons, once controls are active.
The relation between employment of younger and elderly persons seems 
to be a bit more complicated. Most of the coeﬃcients indicate a positive 
relationship. Only for the employment of prime age persons do we get a 
signiﬁ  cant negative relationship.
Adding controls to the speciﬁ  cation reduces the eﬀects of elderly employ-
ment in general. A notable exception is the ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerence eﬀect on 
prime age employment. Here, we see that the strong positive eﬀect of elderly 
employment on prime age employment remains strongly positive.
Table 5.2  Labor market outcomes of young and prime aged persons as a function of 
elderly employment
Youth, 15 to 24 Prime age, 25 to 54
    Unemployment   Employment   School   Unemployment Employment
No controls
Levels –.5069∗∗ 1.3025∗∗ –63.9830∗∗ –.4003∗∗ –.3557∗∗
(.0545) (.1825) (8.7886) (.0511) (.0732)
Three-  year lag on 
elderly employment
–.4768∗∗ 1.1500∗∗ –67.6406∗∗ –.4265∗∗ –.4167∗∗
(.0533) (.1457) (6.6038) (.0409) (.0582)
Five- year  diﬀerence .0107 –.4804∗∗ .4896 .0710 .3426∗∗
(.0911) (.2184) (3.2134) (.0630) (.0940)
Five- year  diﬀerence 
in logs
–1.5536 –.2452 –.0310 –1.036 .2075∗∗
(1.6741) (.1632) (.0881) (1.8496) (.0578)
With controls
Levels –.2535∗∗ –.3641 –9.7485∗∗ –.1267 –.0879
(.1374) (.2335) (4.1037) (.0930) (.0689)
Three-  year lag on 
elderly employment
–.1666∗∗ –.3680∗∗ 1.2367 –.1285∗∗ –.0058
(.0848) (.1311) (2.4476) (.06315) (.0502)
Five- year  diﬀerence –.0024 –.4709∗∗ –.1026 .0692 .3509∗∗
(.0963) (.2361) (3.3805) (.0657) (.0980)
Five- year  diﬀerence 
in logs 
–1.5023 –.2389 –.0415 –.9751 .2156∗∗
(1.7613) (.1760) (.0931) (1.9131) (.0614)
Notes: Reported is the coeﬃcient of elderly employment. Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁ  cant eﬀects 
in bold and marked with asterisks. Estimates in accordance with the boxed economy view are italicized. 
Controls include GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP per capita, minimum wage equivalent, and average 
wage. Data from 1960 to 2006, men and women.
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5.4.2      Labor Outcome for the Young as Function 
of Incentives to Retire Early
We ﬁ rst calculate the incentives to retire. We do this separately for men and 
women. We use two incentive variables used in our earlier work—namely, 
social security wealth (SSW) and peak value (PV). We compute these values 
considering two pathways to retirement: disability retirement and old-  age 
retirement. We weight the two incentive measures using the probability to 
retire through disability.
We then combine the two incentive variables as follows. Let social secu-
rity wealth at age a in year y be denoted by SSW(a, y) and peak value by 
PV∗(a, y). Then, our comprehensive incentive measure is deﬁ  ned as
I(a, y)  {SSW(a, y)  [SSW(a, y)  PV∗(a, y)]}
with weight
  (1  r)(a∗a).
We set r equal to 3 percent; a∗ denotes the age at which SSW is maximized. 
If pension beneﬁ  ts are unavailable at age a, then the pension in the given 
year is set to zero.
Finally, we combine values for men and women using weights of the labor 
force participation of males and females by age and year.
The results for the regressions on the incentives variable are presented in 
table 5.3. Again, we report the results for two age groups, with and without 
controls, for level and ﬁ  rst diﬀerences and for various outcome measures. 
Table 5.3  Labor market outcomes of young and prime aged persons as a function of incentives 
to retire early
Youth, 15 to 24 Prime age, 25 to 54 Elderly
    Unemployment   Employment   School   Unemployment   Employment   Employment
No controls
Levels .1547∗∗ –.4888∗∗ 23.939∗∗ .1377∗∗ .1571∗∗ –.2189∗∗
(.0171) (.0379) (1.803) (.0128) (.0151) (.0323)
First 
diﬀerence
–.3775 .0742 –.8753 –.2503 .0287 .0366
(.5855) (.0581) (.4957) (.5968) (.0194) (.0259)
With controls
Levels .1015∗∗ –.0717 .3597 .0708∗∗ –.0374∗∗ .0163
(.0250) (.0530) (.8262) (.0184) (.0149) (.0362)
First 
diﬀerence
–.0107 –.0081 –.4632 .3506 .0091 .0168
(.0172) (.0358) (.5107) (.5222) (.0159) (.0569)
Notes: Reported is the coeﬃcient of the comprehensive incentive variable. Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁ  cant 
eﬀects in bold and marked with asterisks. Estimates in accordance with the boxed economy view are italicized. Controls 
include GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP per capita, minimum wage equivalent, and average wage. Data from 1960 
to 2006, men and women.
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In addition, we report the eﬀect of incentives on elderly employment in the 
last column of table 5.2.
Looking at the ﬁ  rst row of results (in levels), we see that stronger incentives 
to retire early reduce employment of the younger age groups and increase 
their unemployment. The last column shows the expected negative impact 
on old-  age employment. However, switching to a ﬁ  rst-  diﬀerence speciﬁ  ca-
tion renders the results insigniﬁ  cant. (A similar result is obtained with a 
ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerence speciﬁ  cation.)
Adding controls mitigates the statistical relationship between incen-
tives and employment measures in the level speciﬁ  cation. The signs remain 
unchanged. We do not display in the table the relationship between elderly 
employment and young employment. Adding controls in the diﬀerence spec-
iﬁ  cation does not change results, either; the ﬁ  rst-  diﬀerence results remain 
insigniﬁ  cant, with or without controls.
5.5    Conclusions
The provisions driving workers into early retirement are often motivated 
by “making room for the young.” Underlying this is the popular belief that 
employment of older individuals crowds out employment of younger indi-
viduals. Such beliefs play a strong role in the current German discussion 
about increasing the retirement age from sixty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  seven.
This chapter shows that there is no empirical evidence for this belief. In 
fact, if there is a link at all, the German data reveal that higher employment 
of older individuals is positively correlated with higher employment of the 
young. We ﬁ  rst looked at employment trends between 1960 and 2006. In 
almost all cases, employment of the young and the old moved in tandem 
up or down.
We gave particular attention to those time periods after pension reforms 
when those pension reforms were prima facie not motivated by labor mar-
ket concerns. This avoids potential endogeneity issues. Good cases are the 
1972 reform—which dramatically expanded the German public pension 
system—and the 1992 reform—which started a cost- cutting reform process. 
Again, employment of the young and employment of the old were positively 
correlated in the aftermath of these reforms.
Finally, we used various regression approaches to purge this correlation 
from business cycle eﬀects and to study the direct eﬀect of early retirement 
incentives on youth and prime age employment. The results vary consider-
ably across speciﬁ  cations; many remain insigniﬁ  cant. Of the signiﬁ  cant ones, 
few speciﬁ  cations follow the “boxed economy view,” while many more sup-
port the positive correlation visible in the time series data.
Hence, the suggestive power of the often invoked analogy of a small 
enterprise with a ﬁ  xed and small number of clients as a model for the entire 
economy is grossly misleading. In contrast to a small enterprise, entire 166        Axel Börsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel
economies can grow, increasing the demand for all goods and services and 
therefore also the demand for labor. Moreover, costs for early retirement 
cannot be put on someone else’s shoulders, as enterprises often can do 
it. In an entire economy, all social transfer expenses have to be borne by 
tax and contribution payers. Since costs for early retirement increase total 
labor compensation of the young, thus making their labor more expensive, 
it should not come as a surprise that early retirement for the old causes less 
employment of the young.
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